U.S. imports of data center equipment reached $653 billion in 2025, more than double their 2020 level. That total breaks into two distinct supply chains: nearly $580 billion in computing hardware (servers, chips, networking, cooling) and more than $70 billion in power infrastructure (transformers, switchgear, lithium-ion batteries). Tariffs and export controls have reshaped the first. The second remains dangerously exposed.

Shortages of transformers, switchgear, and batteries are already threatening to delay the buildout. Lead times for large power transformers have stretched to as long as five years, and roughly 40% of planned U.S. data center capacity faces delays tied to equipment and power availability. The equipment the United States cannot manufacture fast enough is the same equipment it increasingly sources from China.

The power supply chain tells the opposite story. China’s share of U.S. lithium-ion battery imports peaked at 71% in 2023 and remains at 59%. China controls 99% of global lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathode production, the battery chemistry of choice for data centers and grid-scale storage. Transformer imports show signs of rerouting through Southeast Asia to circumvent tariffs.

Tariffs proved they can redirect trade flows. They have not yet proved they can rebuild domestic production. The computing stack needs to be reshored, not just rerouted. The power stack needs both: strengthening 45X production incentives, enforcing FEOC restrictions at the processing stage, investing in allied cathode processing networks, and investigating transformer rerouting through Southeast Asia.

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